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THE STRUCTURE OF UK OUTBOUND FDI AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: We study whether the pattern of outbound Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is 
influenced by host countries’ environmental regulations. We employ a general empirical 
location model that captures interactions between industry attributes and host country 
characteristics in determining firm location. We use data on UK-based multinational 
activity in 64 countries and 23 industries over the period 2002-2006. Our results suggest 
a significant effect of environmental policy on the pattern of UK outbound FDI – a 
pollution haven effect. A one standard deviation increase in environmental laxity 
increases FDI (assets) in industries that are above-average pollution intensive by 28%. 
 
 
Keywords: pollution-haven, competitiveness, environmental-regulation, industry-
location, FDI 
2 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF UK OUTBOUND FDI AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
 
 
1. Introduction 
With the rising elimination of trade and investment barriers across the world there has 
been a growing interest in the question of the role of differential environmental 
regulations in the location decisions of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and trade 
flows. A dominant hypothesis addressing this question is the pollution haven hypothesis 
(PHH) that purports that trade liberalization results in a relocation of dirty goods 
production to jurisdictions with lax environmental regulation. 
The PHH calls into question the efficacy of domestic environmental standards, 
especially with respect to climate policy, because the location of emission of 
greenhouse gasses is irrelevant to the problem of climate change. More generally, the 
PHH is at the heart of the trade and environment debate. For example, the growing 
discussion on the theoretical and practical merit of a ‘border carbon tax’ is a direct 
result of the assumption that jurisdictions with higher carbon prices will be at a 
competitive disadvantage (Subramanian and Mattoo, 2013). Also, in several European 
countries that have implemented a carbon tax, industry lobby has succeeded in securing 
exemptions or rebates for trade- and energy-intensive firms to avoid the ‘risk of job 
losses and carbon-leakage’ (Martin et al.,  2012). A related broader issue here is that if 
environmental regulations indeed impair competitiveness with the consequent 
migration of polluting firms to countries with weaker (or weakly enforced) regulations, 
there might be some ground for bringing domestic environmental regulations into the 
domain of trade agreements to prevent a possible ‘race to the bottom’ in environmental 
standards (Copeland and Taylor, 2004).While theoretically plausible and widely held, the 
PHH is yet to receive unequivocal empirical support (see, for e.g., Millimet and Roy, 
2015; Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2015; Manderson and Kneller, 2012; Kellenberg, 
2009; Raspiller and Riedinger, 2008; Cole and Elliott, 2005). 
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The objective of this paper is to provide new evidence on the issue of pollution 
havens by examining the pattern of UK’s foreign direct investment (FDI) in 64 host 
countries in 23 industries over the period 2002-2006. The global share of the UK’s FDI 
outflows is second only to that of the US (Figure 1). Indeed in 2007, before the 2008 
financial crisis when global FDI sharply declined, the UK’s stock of FDI was over $1.7 
trillion (UN, 2008). The UK has also one of the most stringent environmental regulations 
in the world (see Section 4). These two factors make the UK a suitable county for testing 
the pollution haven effect. 
 
 
Figure 1 FDI outflows (% of world total)  
 
We complement the existing empirical literature of mixed evidence with an empirical 
strategy that estimates how high and low levels of country characteristics interact with 
high and low intensities of the corresponding industry attributes in location decisions of 
firms. We also employ a rich three way panel dataset and address the endogeneity of 
both environmental policy and pollution intensity. Our results are in contrast to some of 
the evidence documented recently: we find a significant pollution haven effect. 
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In the next section we present the related literature and our contribution thereto. In 
Section 3 we present our data. Section 4 introduces our empirical strategy. In Section 5 
we discuss our results and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Related Literature 
The empirical literature on environmental regulation,  investment and trade flows has a 
history going back to the early 1970s.  As the earlier literature has been reviewed in 
great detail, we focus here on key recent empirical literature.1 An overview of these 
studies is provided in Table A.2. A generic empirical model of FDI flows can be written 
as: 
tkititktitkitki RXYFDI ,,,,,,,       (1) 
where FDI  is a vector of a measure of a multinational enterprise’s activity (including a 
binary variable of 0 or 1 for the existence of a multinational enterprise) in location i, 
industry k and year t. Y and X are, respectively, matrices of observable control variables, 
namely: location characteristics and industry attributes. The variable R represents 
stringency of environmental regulation.  ,   and   are vectors of, respectively, time-
invariant location and industry fixed effects, and location- and industry-invariant time 
fixed effects.   and   are vectors of coefficients,  is a coefficient and   is a vector of 
error terms. Few papers have estimated this very general specification (e.g. Poelhekke 
and van der Ploeg 2015 albeit with rather aggregate sectors of twelve in number of 
which five are manufacturing). Kellenberg (2009) which uses a ‘region’ dummy instead 
of ‘country’ dummy for location fixed effects is closer to this general formulation. Either 
index i or j doesn’t appear in most other papers. The reason for this is unavailability of 
such a rich three-dimensional dataset; or when it is available as in the case of 
Kellenberg, for example, the limited year-to-year variation in most country 
                                                     
1Jaffe et al. (1995) and Copeland and Taylor (2004) present two prominent reviews. The earliest studies 
were of exploratory nature investigating trends in trade, especially in dirty goods. The results reported by 
these studies are mixed but suffer from a serious weakness. “The search for pollution havens in the data 
has obscured the role capital accumulation and natural resources must play in determining dirty-industry 
migration” (Copeland and Taylor, 2004, p. 41). 
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characteristics variables (especially the environmental variable) makes estimation 
impossible due to multicollinearity. 
While most of the empirical literature is broadly based on Equation (1) differences 
abound along various dimensions: sample, especially inbound versus outbound FDI; 
measures of the environmental variable; data; empirical strategy, etc. 
One major strand of the literature is focused on inbound FDI, mainly to the U.S. List 
and Co (2000), Keller and Levinson (2002), Frederiksson et al. 2003 and Millimet and Ray 
2015) all find some evidence of a pollution haven effect. Studies that focus on inbound 
FDI to countries other than the U.S. include Javorcik and Wei (2004) who examine 
inbound FDI to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; Dean et al. (2009) that 
focus on inbound FDI to China; Waldkirch and Gopinath (2008) who consider the case of 
inbound FDI to Mexico; and Cole and Frederiksson (2009) who analyse patterns of FDI 
inflows to 13 OECD and 20 developing countries. The results in each of these studies are 
rather heterogeneous (suggesting mixed evidence) along various dimensions: measures 
of environmental stringency (Javorcik and Wei, 2004); measures of pollution and groups 
of industries (Waldkirch and Gopinath, 2008); and pollution intensity and country of 
origin of FDI (Dean et al. 2009). 
Since studies on inbound FDI typically involve a single country, namely the US there 
is some advantage in terms of ease in disentangling the potential effect of differential 
regulation across regions/states (within a country) which tend to be homogenous with 
respect to a variety of factors that can be related to environmental regulation. 
Furthermore, such studies get around the problem of reliable cross-country measures of 
environmental policy. However, it has been argued that a test of the PHH should 
primarily be based on cross country data (Taylor, 2004). This is because a cross country 
setting will better allow the explicit consideration of various host country characteristics 
that determine investment location. Furthermore, some data suggest that US 
environmental policy has over time become less stringent than the  rich world average 
(Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2015). That means the disproportionate focus on the US, 
which is presumably to do with the notion that US’s environmental policy is relatively 
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the most stringent hence making other countries potential pollution havens, will not be 
justified. 
There is a growing empirical literature on outbound FDI in a multi-country setting. In 
this strand of the literature too, there are variations along different dimensions or issues 
including findings of the pollution haven effect. The first issue concerns measures of 
environmental regulation which has been argued to be a major factor affecting 
empirical findings on the subject under discussion (Levinson and Taylor 2008). Some use 
such proxies as government or firm spending or pollution intensity (e.g. Xing and Kolstad 
2002; Eskeland and Harrison 2003) others employ one or another subjective indices (see 
Table 1.A.). One particular such index that seems to have become popular recently (e.g. 
Wagner and Timmins 2009; Kellenberg 2009; Poelhekke & van der Ploeg 2015) is 
company executives’ opinion on stringency and enforcement of environmental 
regulation - from the Global Competitiveness Report. This measure has some clear 
advantages as it represents a measure of both stringency and enforcement and in the 
words of Kellenberg (2009, p. 245) it “explicitly accounts for actual firm perceptions of 
regulation and enforcement [and] is crucial for estimating pollution haven effects.” 
The second issue is data. While more and more studies use panel data (see Table 
1.A.) which allow for modelling of unobserved heterogeneity across countries, some 
have to rely on cross-section data due to data limitations (e.g. Kheder & Zugravu 2012, 
Manderson & Kneller 2012).2 
The third issue is empirical strategy. Some focus especially on developing countries 
as potential pollution havens. For example, Eskeland and Harrison (2003) examine the 
pattern of U.S. FDI to developing countries. They find no robust evidence for the 
emergence of pollution havens – a result they ascribe to the potential complimentarity 
between capital (which the U.S. is well endowed with) and pollution abatement. In a 
similar vein Cole and Elliot (2005) investigate the pattern of U.S. FDI flows to Brazil and 
Mexico – countries that are not too capital-poor and hence, the authors argue, are likely 
pollution havens because of a strong correlation between capital intensity and pollution 
                                                     
2 It should be noted that the firm level study of Manderson and Kneller (2012) still allows for country and 
firm fixed effects because of the repeated observations of firms in their data.   
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intensity. They find that the key forces of attraction for a U.S. industry are its capital 
requirements while pollution control costs in the U.S. are also a push factor. The main 
message from these studies is that firms’ location choice depends on a variety of factors 
of which environmental regulation is only one. Lax environmental regulation in 
developing countries might be attractive to FDI but if such countries have rigid labour 
laws, firms might be deterred from such countries (Hanna 2010). In this respect Kheder 
and Zugravu’s (2012) mixed evidence on French outbound FDI may not be surprising. 
They report a pollution haven effect for their pooled sample and for some subsets of the 
sample but not for developing countries that have ‘too lax’ environmental regulation. 
The same can be said about Poelhekke and van der Ploeg’s (2015) somewhat unique 
evidence of both pollution haven effects and green haven effects (where Corporate-
Social-Responsibility-minded footloose sectors are attracted by higher environmental 
standards).3 
The fourth issue is potential endogeneity of environmental regulation. As can be 
seen in Table 1.A. more and more studies appear to be addressing potential 
endogeneity and as observed by Copeland and Taylor (2004) accounting for endogeneity 
of environmental policy and unobserved location and industry heterogeneity seem to 
help uncover the pollution haven effect. Thus to some extent one could argue that the 
evidence in the literature might be converging on finding the pollution haven effect. But 
it is far from being conclusive; just note the “green haven effects” suggested by 
Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2015). This paper complements this growing literature of 
inconclusive empirical evidence, especially the one and only UK outbound FDI study (of 
Manderson and Kneller, 2012), by using a different methodology and dataset. We 
employ a general empirical location model that captures interactions between country 
and industry characteristics in determining firm location. True, Manderson and Kneller 
(2012) also use interaction of the pollution-intensity variable with every country 
characteristic variable, but what we are referring to here is interaction of every country 
                                                     
3 This refers to firms being concerned about corporate reputation or ‘green credentials’; and already 
having a higher environmental standard at home might be attracted to jurisdictions with stringent 
environmental standards. Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2015) examine this possibility in their regressions 
through interaction terms between sectoral dummy and the environmental policy variable. 
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variable (of factor endowment and the one derived from economic geography) with the 
corresponding industry attribute to capture the joint influence of country characteristics 
and industry attributes on the location of economic activities. In this respect our paper 
also complements Wagner and Timmins (2009) which undertakes an industry by industry 
analysis of only six manufacturing sectors. 
The key is to capture the likely heterogeneous impact of environmental policy across 
industries (Millimet and List, 2004). Indeed this is the main finding of Poelhekke and van 
der Ploeg (2015): ‘there is no average effect of regulation and enforcement’. In this 
spirit, our empirical strategy is explicitly based on the idea of ‘above/below average’ 
levels of industry attributes such as ‘pollution intensity’ and the corresponding country 
characteristics, ‘stringency of environmental regulation’. 
To the best of our knowledge the data in this paper have not been examined before. 
Similar to those of Kellenberg (2009) and Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2015) our dataset is 
a three-way panel of 64 countries and 23 industries over the period 2002-2006.  This 
allows for a more flexible specification where different structures of unobservable fixed 
effects can be modelled. Unlike some of the papers that focus on whether or not firms locate 
in countries/regions with lax environmental policy - i.e. the extensive margin of FDI (e.g. Dean 
et al. 2009; Javorcik and Wei 2004; Manderson & Kneller 2012) our paper examines if 
firms already operating in a host country change their level of activities in response to the 
stringency of regulation (i.e. the intensive margin of FDI). As argued by Manderson and Kneller 
(2012, p. 319) and Hanna (2010, p. 178), if the fixed costs of locating in a new host country is 
substantial or if firms perceive regulations to be only temporary, very few firms are likely to be 
attracted to lax regulation countries that have relatively high ‘entry costs’. If instead a firm 
were already in a host country and, let’s suppose, not operating full capacity, then one would 
expect the firm to step up its activity in response to a stringent regulation at home (Hanna, 
2010, p. 178). Finally, like most recent studies but unlike others such as  Dean et al. (2009) and 
Manderson and Kneller (2012) we attempt to address the issue of endogeneity of 
environmental regulation which has been alleged, as discussed above, to plague the 
results of some of the studies in the literature. 
9 
 
We find a significant pollution haven effect. A one standard deviation increase in 
environmental laxity increases FDI (assets) in industries that are above-average 
pollution intensive by 28%. Comparison of our estimated effect of environmental policy 
with others’ estimates is not straightforward because of differences in: outcome 
measures (for example value added versus assets), model specifications and the specific 
effect presented/provided in the papers. Nonetheless we will attempt to make some 
broad comparisons with others’ estimates in the conclusion section. 
3. Estimating equation 
To examine the relevance of various factors in industry location we adopt an empirical model 
similar to those of Mulatu et al. (2010) and Gerlagh et al. (2015). The main theme in 
these models is that the location of economic activity is determined by the interaction of 
country characteristics with the corresponding industry attributes. This framework has its 
roots in Romalis’ (2004) seminal empirical model of trade flows where he directly 
derives from theory an empirical equation that relates a country’s commodity trade to 
its characteristics (including factor endowments) and industry attributes (chiefly factor 
intensities). For example, evaluation of whether or not capital is a source of comparative 
advantage is judged by the coefficient of the interaction term of capital abundance and 
capital intensity.  In what follows we provide a brief narrative summary of the 
framework. Countries are heterogeneous in various aspects such as endowments of natural 
resource and stringency of environmental regulation. Likewise, industries differ in their 
various attributes such as the intensity of use of production factors like labour and the extent 
of pollution intensity. So if country characteristics xj matters for location, every industry 
would want to locate in a country that is rich in xj but a country can only accommodate 
so many industries.  We expect that industries that highly value that country characteristic, 
i.e. those industries with large yj will gravitate towards that country. All else equal, a labour 
intensive industry will tend to locate in a country with abundant labour, while pollution 
intensive industries will be attracted to countries with a relatively lax environmental 
regulation. 
10 
 
We measure manufacturing industry activity (FDI) by assets (and in a robustness 
check, we also use an alternative outcome measure: turnover). The country 
characteristics (together with the corresponding industry attributes) can be derived 
from Heckscher-Ohlin type comparative advantage arguments based on the role of factor 
endowments and/ or from New Economic Geography (NEG) that stresses the importance of 
market access. Accordingly we specify our baseline econometric model as: 
tkitkitii
j
tk
j
tij
j
tki zyxFDI ,,,,,,, lnlnln ∑              (2) 
where i, k and t  index respectively country, industry and year. X is a vector of country 
characteristics and y is a vector of associated industry attributes. We consider the following 
five pairs of country characteristics and industry attributes: environmental regulation 
stringency and pollution intensity, capital abundance and capital intensity, skilled labour 
abundance and skilled labour intensity, R&D abundance and R&D intensity and market 
potential and scale economies. The first four pairs, those related to environment, labour and 
R&D are standard variables from Heckscher-Ohlin type models of trade and industry location 
(Copeland and Taylor 2004) while the last pair, the one related to market potential is  
emphasised by NEG (see e.g. Krugman and Venables 1995). The HO predicts that industries 
that use a factor of production intensively will tend to locate in countries which are rich in that 
factor whereas NEG predicts that the attraction of a country’s market potential is greater the 
larger an industry’s scale economies are.  The reason is that firms in such an industry are likely 
to locate in larger markets/central locations to minimize transport costs. Therefore, the 
coefficients of the interaction variables β are expected to be positive for all except for the 
environmental variable. 
To ease interpretation of the estimated coefficients, we follow Michielsen (2013) and 
standardize each country characteristic by imposing zero mean and unit standard deviation, 
and specify each industry attribute in discrete terms such that it is equal to zero for industries 
with a value below the mean, and one for industries with a value above the average. In a 
robustness check, we use these variables in continuous terms. 
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We also include in Equation (2) a vector of country characteristics (z) that are general in 
the sense that their influence on location is not industry specific. This set of variables includes: 
the level of crime, infrastructure quality, intellectual property protection, education quality, 
FDI stocks, hiring & firing practices, tariff and corruption. We will also explore standard gravity 
variables (distance and common language).  In the equation, θ and δ are vectors of 
respectively country and industry fixed effects, τ is a vector of time fixed effects and ε is a 
vector of the error terms. The country fixed effects absorb the effects of any unobserved 
country characteristics that affect all industries such as distance, language, geography, culture, 
and policy of one sort or another. The industry fixed effects control for the effects of any 
unobserved industry characteristics common to a particular industry such as technology and 
size. The time fixed effects capture the impacts of factors such as macroeconomic shocks that 
may affect all industries in all countries in a certain time period.4 
Ideally one would like to include the linear or constituent terms x and y in Equation 2.5  
However, as some of the variables of industry attributes and country characteristics hardly 
vary over time, and also because we include fixed effects, it wouldn’t seem very practical to 
include the linear terms in our regression model. Thus, exclusion of these terms from our 
model amounts to an assumption that the linear terms are indeed absorbed by the country 
and industry fixed effects. However, we will still explore estimations with inclusion of these 
linear terms and report the results. 
4. Data and construction of variables 
We use a three-way panel dataset of 23 two-digit standard manufacturing industry 
classification groups, (UK SIC 2007=NACE 2), (operating in) 64 host countries over the period 
2002-2006. Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix report the list of countries and industries, 
                                                     
4 We will experiment with different permutations of these three sets of fixed effects. 
5 Mulatu et al. (2010) use cross-section data and hence include the linear terms of country characteristics 
and sector attributes. This in turn allows them to estimate the cut-off points. A cut-off point for a country 
characteristic refers to a neutral level of the characteristics such that a country with this level does not 
specifically attract sectors with high or low levels for the associated sector attribute. Similarly, a cut off 
point for a sector attribute refers to neutral level of the attribute such that a sector with this attribute 
level does not consider the associated country-characteristic in the selection of its location. 
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respectively. Some countries are excluded from our sample for one reason or another, the 
details of which are described in the Appendix. 
Detailed data description including data sources is provided in Tables 1-2. Here we 
highlight some general data issues and also provide further description of the main variables 
of interest in this paper, i.e. the outcome measures and the environmental variables. All 
monetary values are in 2005 PPP $. It has to be noted that, as is common in this literature, 
quite a few of our variables don’t show significant variation over time. This is likely to cause 
problems in terms multicolinearity and obtaining estimates that are sharply estimated.   
Outcome variables 
Our key variable Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is defined as the direct and indirect 
ownership or control of a single (UK) legal entity of at least 10% of voting securities of 
an incorporated foreign business enterprise (Orbis database, Bureau van Dijk). 
FDI and multinational production activities can be measured in various ways. At one 
end of the spectrum one could simply look at whether or not a multinational exists in a 
certain location. More specific measures are also available: assets, turnover, value 
added, employment, net income, capital stock, etc. 
Whether the appropriate measure of FDI activity is assets or more ‘fluid’ measures such as 
sales depends on the nature of FDI, namely horizontal (market seeking) versus vertical (those 
segmenting their stages of production). As argued by Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2015, p. 
1162), most FDI is found to be the latter type and hence assets would be a better measure 
because sales could be zero for any particular affiliate in the product chain. It can also be 
argued that the choice depends on whether one is interested in capturing relatively 
‘permanent’ changes in FDI or ‘transitory’ ones (Hanna, 2010, p. 177). For example, a firm 
operating under capacity might respond by increasing its operations using its existing 
equipment whilst keeping its assets intact. 
To represent these different scenarios, our (alternative) outcome measures are industry 
level total assets and turnover. These data are part of Orbis dataset of Bureau van Dijk.  The 
Orbis database provide affiliate-level information on, among other variables,  assets and 
turnover for about 1000 UK manufacturing multinational firms (MNE) in 103 countries. The 
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data include only majority-owned affiliates. MNE is defined as the combination of a 
single (UK) legal entity that has made foreign direct investment (FDI), called the parent, 
and at least one foreign affiliate. 
The years for which data are available differ somewhat from variable to variable but 
generally the period extends from about 2000 to beyond 2010 and most likely with frequent 
updates. Our choice of the sample period was dictated by availability of data on the 
environmental variables. To the best of our knowledge this dataset hasn’t been employed 
before in the form we are using it. Manderson and Kneller (2012) have apparently used a 
related dataset from Bureau van Dijk that relates to year 2005.  
We aggregate these data by industry-country. We considered working with firm-level 
data but there would be too may firm-country observations for any meaningful analysis. 
It is true that a firm level study would be more informative because of the potential 
firm-level heterogeneity6 but it is worth noting that even in firm level studies the key 
variable environmental cost is measured at industry level (see Hanna 2010; 
Manderson & Kneller 2012) limiting the advantage of a firm level data. 
There are several industry-country observations with zero entries. When we use a 
log function in our estimation, we add a small number (0.1) for such observations.  
Country and industry characteristics 
The industry and country characteristics are summarised in Tables 1 and 2, respectively. As 
already pointed out above, in addition to the environmental variables we consider four 
county characteristics and their corresponding industry attributes and use them as interaction 
variables. Three of these are factor endowment variables: capital abundance, skilled-labour 
abundance and R&D abundance. The respective industry attributes are capital intensity, 
skilled-labour intensity and R&D intensity. The fourth country characteristics is market 
potential proxied here by GDP. The corresponding industry attribute is economies of scale 
captured here by plant size (namely number of employees per plant). We also use additional 
country control variables that are commonly used in the literature. These include:  crime, IP 
                                                     
6 Differences in underlying firm characteristics might suggest the need for controlling for such 
characteristics in empirical modelling of outward FDI (Manderson and Kneller 2012).   
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protection, quality of education, infrastructure, hiring and firing practices, tariff, 
corruption, FDI stock, distance and common language. The construction of all of these 
variables and the data sources are presented in Tables 1 and 2.   For some of the variables of 
country and industry characteristics we have made use of interpolation to complete missing 
data the details which are explained in the Appendix. The fifth and key variables of ours are 
the environmental ones.  
  < Tables 1 and 2 about here> 
To capture both environmental regulation stringency and its enforcement we represent 
environmental policy stringency by the product of the stringency and enforcement indices 
(see Kellenberg, 2009 and Poelhekke and van der Ploeg, 2015). For consistency with our 
definition of the other factor endowment variables, we use the inverse of the stringency 
(defined as one minus the index divided by 50) and call it ‘environmental laxity’. Our measures 
of environmental stringency and enforcement come from the Global Competitiveness Report 
published by World Economic Forum. They are based on an annual Executive Opinion Survey 
(of thousands of business executives) that asks their views about respectively the stringency 
and enforcement of environmental regulation in their country.7 As can be seen in Figure 2, UK 
has one of the relatively stringent environmental regulation and enforcement regimes in the 
world. This might, all else equal, should lead home firms, at least those that are relatively 
pollution-intensive, to seek pollution havens. 
                                                     
7 As already discussed these environmental variables are also used by Poelhekke and van der Ploeg 
(2015), Manderson and Kneller (2012), Kellenberg (2009) and Wagner and Timmins (2009). 
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Endogeneity of environmental regulation and pollution intensity (environmental costs) 
Our measure of environmental policy is potentially endogenous, i.e. such a policy 
responds to the size and structure of MNE activity. Jurisdictions with large production of 
polluting MNE might raise their environmental standards or those with negligible 
amount of polluting activities may not enact stringent environmental policies (Millimet 
and Roy 2015). Following Kellenberg (2009) we use agricultural value added per worker 
and agricultural land per agricultural worker as instruments. The argument is that these 
variables should reflect a country’s relative technology level which determines the level 
of national production and is also positively correlated with environmental policy but 
should not directly affect manufacturing production.8 
The first of our instrument, agricultural value added per worker is obviously closely related 
with technology and affluence and hence higher environmental standards. In our sample the 
correlation between this variable and our environmental policy stringency and enforcement 
variable is larger 0.7. The second instrument, agricultural land per worker, is probably not as 
closely related to technology and environmental standards as is the first instrument. In our 
sample, its correlation with our environmental variable is about 0.33. Still the highest scoring 
                                                     
8 We have also considered ‘agricultural machinery per worker’ as an additional instrument but data for 
this variable is missing for a lot of countries. 
Figure 2 Environmental stringency index (2002-2006) 
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countries on this measure are some of the affluent countries such as Australia, Canada, US, 
UK, France, Denmark and Sweden. Contrasting these are countries like the Netherlands and 
Norway which have relatively very low agricultural land per worker but have stringent 
environmental standards.   Nonetheless, as we will see in our estimation results the two 
instruments jointly do fairly well in instrumenting environmental policy stringency and 
enforcement.  
The corresponding industry attribute of pollution intensity is measured by ‘environmental 
expenditure as a share of value-added’. This is a commonly used measure in the literature. 
However, like our environmental regulation variable this variable of pollution intensity can 
also be endogenous. That is to say migration of pollution intensive industries would result in 
lowering of pollution intensity at home.9It is hard to think of an appropriate instrument for 
this variable though. Hence, we will use the lagged value of the variable - as a somewhat 
crude way of handling the potential endogeneity. 
5. Results and discussion  
Our main estimation results are presented in Table 3. The first two columns are results of OLS 
estimation. In column (1) we have a structure of fixed effects where industry, country and 
year fixed effects are entered individually. In column (2) industry fixed effects are interacted 
with year. This is a better control for unobserved industry characteristics that affect FDI across 
a whole industry in a given year (e.g. changes in technology or size and other industry-specific 
shocks).  In a robustness check, we will further experiment with a similar formulation for 
country fixed effects – i.e. letting the country dummy interact with year. These two sets of 
fixed effects are meant to soak up unobserved (time-variant) industry-specific and 
country-specific effects, respectively.  
< Table 3 about here> 
The two sets of results reported in columns (1) and (2) are broadly similar but the later 
appears to be better judging by the magnitude and significance of the environmental variable 
                                                     
9 We owe this point to two anonymous referees.  
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and the coefficient of determination. In these OLS regressions we note that the 
environmental policy index (laxity) interaction variable has the expected positive impact, the 
coefficients of the traditional factor endowment interaction variables (excepting the capital 
variable) are also positive and significant. Likewise the market potential and scale economies 
interaction variable is positive and significant.  
Columns (3)-(5) present the results of the IV-2SLS estimations where we use 
agricultural land per worker and agricultural value added per worker as instruments. 
The results in column (3) are the IV counterparts of the OLS results shown in column (2). 
The two sets of results are fairly similar. In column (4) the results include standard 
gravity variables of distance (in miles from London, UK) and the common language – 
instead of the country fixed effects. Both distance and common language have a 
significant negative impact on FDI; the former is as expected while the latter is contrary 
to expectation. This set of results is likely to be questionable given that there are no 
country fixed effects. But perhaps it shows how the fixed effects (in Column 5 and 
elsewhere) seem to soak up the effects of the observable country variables that are not 
very time-varying. The remaining results are similar to those shown in column (3). In 
column (5) the specification reintroduces the two sets of fixed effects together with 
standard control variables capturing general policy environment and infrastructure. Once 
again the main results are generally similar to the other IV estimation results. The results with 
respect to the control variables are more or less as expected (more on this below). 
We begin our discussion of the validity of our IV estimation with a look at the first 
stage regressions of the three IV models reported in columns (3) – (5). The estimation 
results are shown in Table A.4 in the appendix. In all three cases we see that the first 
stage regressions perform well. The F-statistic is very large, because the instruments are 
very strong. The individual t-statistics are all large, for example in Column 3: 7.4 and 
38.8, and hence the F statistic is very large, i.e. rejecting the null that both coefficients 
are equal to 0. 
The remaining standard specification tests for the IV-2SLS estimations (reported and 
explained at the bottom of Tables 3 and A.5) suggest that the identification strategy 
18 
 
using these instruments generally works well. In all cases, the Anderson canonical 
correlation likelihood ratio test firmly rejects the null of model under-identification and 
the Craig-Donald F-test rejects the null of weak instruments. To test whether the 
instruments are valid, we performed the Hansen J-test for over-identifying restrictions. 
We find that the null of valid instruments is largely rejected albeit marginally. However, 
given the strength of the results of the F-statistics of the weak identification tests the 
marginal failure of the J. Hansen validity test is not very worrisome because the 
exclusion restriction cannot be tested (Stock et al. 2002) - and thus the models are 
supported.  Finally, the Anderson-Rubin Chi-Square-test rejects its null hypothesis and 
indicates that the endogenous regressors are relevant. 
The results with respect to the environmental variable are broadly similar across the 
IV regressions – except that the one without the country fixed effects has a larger 
magnitude. The pollution haven effect is consistently present. The magnitude of the 
environmental variable is larger in the IV regressions compared to those in the OLS. This 
is consistent with much of the evidence documented in the literature (Millimet and Roy 
2015).10  
For interpretation of the actual magnitudes of the estimated coefficients, let’s refer to the 
results reported in the last column of Table 3. The estimated coefficient of the environmental 
interaction variable suggests that a one standard deviation increase in environmental laxity 
would lead to a 28% increase in FDI (assets) in pollution intensive industries.  More generally 
the positive estimated coefficient of the environmental variable suggests that FDI in relatively 
more pollution intensive industries (such as leather & related products, paper & pulp products 
and coke & refined petroleum products) would be drawn to countries which have relatively 
lax environmental standards (such as Guatemala and Ethiopia). A similar interpretation holds 
for the other pairs of variables. Thus, for example, FDI in industries with above-average scale 
economies tend to locate in countries that have relatively larger domestic market potential. 
The role played by environmental laxity is stronger than the other traditional factor 
                                                     
10 Levinson and Taylor (2008) present a detailed discussion on statistical and theoretical sources of 
endogeneity of measures of environmental regulation and that, if unaccounted for, it can work against 
finding the pollution haven effect. 
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endowment variables. We find no evidence that capital abundance plays any role in attracting 
FDI in capital intensive industries.  One possible explanation for this is capital mobility. 
The estimated coefficients of all the variables we labelled as ‘general’ country 
controls (excepting hiring & firing and infrastructure) have plausible signs and are 
mostly significant (see column 3). Crime and corruption seem to deter FDI. IP protection, 
education quality and FDI stock (capturing agglomeration effects) all play a positive role 
in attracting FDI. Tariff can arguably take a positive or negative sign. It can have a 
positive influence if FDI is a horizontal sort attempting to ‘jump tariffs’ or a deterring 
effect if FDI is a vertical type with segments of production stages and hence trade in 
intermediate goods is important (Kellenberg, 2009). Rather surprisingly, the coefficient 
of hiring & firing has a perverse sign and is significant. Perhaps inevitably, with inclusion 
of country fixed effects in the regression almost all of these country variables turn out to 
be insignificant (see column 4). 
Robustness checks 
As mentioned above, we have experimented with alternative specifications – by way of 
robustness checks.  The results are reported in Table A.5 in the Appendix. We have explored 
an alternative outcome measure – turnover. The results shown in column (1) are broadly 
similar to the main results where our outcome measure is assets. Especially, the estimated 
coefficients of the environmental variable are very similar in the two specifications. Hence we 
fail to confirm the above mentioned argument by Poelhekke and van der Ploeg’s (2015) that 
sales might not be an appropriate measure of vertical FDI which is the type that is more 
prevalent in practice. 
The use of continuous variables for the pair of interaction variables instead of the 
standardized country variables interacted with ‘discretized’ industry attributes doesn’t change 
the results qualitatively – see column (2). 
Inclusion of the constituent linear terms of the country and industry characteristics in our 
regression appears to confirm our main results (see column 3).  Consistent with the findings 
thus far the interaction variables that capture the joint role of country and industry 
characteristics are positive and significant – with skilled labour only marginally insignificant. As 
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always the capital variable is the exception with the wrong sign but it is not significant. The 
coefficients of the linear terms are largely insignificant. As already pointed out earlier, we 
wouldn’t expect such regression to come out particularly well given the numerous closely 
related industry and country characteristics in the regression and the resulting 
multicolinearity.   
We have also explored with inclusion of country-year fixed effects to capture country-year 
specific effects. But the regression as a whole seems to breakdown – rather unsurprisingly 
given the large number of fixed effects (about 280) to be included and the resulting sever 
multicollinearity. As an alternative we have tried region-year specific effects.11 Two variants 
are explored. Column (4) reports results with region-by-year fixed effects and industry-by-year 
effects while in column (5) we report results with region-by-year fixed effects and industry 
specific effects. In both regressions our main results remain more or less intact.  
A final robustness check we undertook was clustered standard errors at country level to 
allow for both autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. The results are reported in column (6). 
Once again the results are in line with our main story: a pollution haven effect and similarly 
positive coefficients for all the other interaction variables as well. The capital variable is also 
rather consistent in its perverse sign. 
Before ending our discussion on robustness checks, one last issue we would like to 
mention is the question of the time-variability of our environmental policy measure.  
Although there is no particular ground for suspecting the validity of the time series variation 
of our measure of environmental policy and studies have used the measure as such (see e.g. 
Kellenberg 2009; Poelhekke and van der Ploeg 2015), one could argue that the small year-to-
year variation of the variable might have to do with “changes in the interview process” 
(see Wagner and Timmins 2009).   To probe this, we have explored regressions with a time 
constant measure: averaging (over time) the values of our stringency measure and the 
corresponding environmental cost variable. All the key results are intact; especially the 
environmental variable remains significant at the 10% level of significance. Of course 
                                                     
11 We consider eight regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East 
and North Africa, South Asia, East Asia & Pacific, Western Europe and North America. 
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such regressions that do not have country and industry fixed effects should be 
questionable. 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper sets out to investigate the question of whether UK-based multinational companies 
are attracted to countries with weaker (or weakly enforced) environmental regulations. The 
pollution haven hypothesis (PHH) underlying this question has yet to receive robust empirical 
evidence. Whilst the PHH should primarily be tested using cross-country data, most studies 
focus on inward FDI mainly to the US. Moreover some data suggest that US’s environmental 
regulation is no longer more stringent than the average in the rich world. 
This paper adds to the relatively limited literature that focuses on outbound FDI patterns 
and hence using cross-country data. We employ a general empirical location model in which 
environmental regulation is one of several motives for location choices. This approach allows 
for the recently emerging idea that ‘there mayn’t be an average effect of environmental 
policy’ meaning environmental policy is likely to have heterogeneous impact across industries.  
We use a novel three-way panel dataset of 23 two-digit standard manufacturing industry 
classification groups, (UK SIC 2007=NACE 2), (operating in) 64 host countries over the period 
2002-2006. UK is a major player in FDI globally, second only to the US at least during our 
sample period, and it also has one of the stringent (and strictly enforced) environmental 
regulations. 
The results suggest that environmental policy has a significant impact on the pattern of UK 
outbound FDI. FDI in relatively more polluting industries (above average in terms of pollution-
intensity) gravitate towards countries with relatively lax environmental regulation. The effect 
of environmental policy on the pattern of UK outbound FDI is stronger than that of the 
traditional factor endowment variables such as skilled labour and research and development 
abundance. In short we document a statistically and economically significant pollution haven 
effect. A one standard deviation increase in environmental laxity increases FDI (assets) in 
industries that are above-average pollution intensive by 28%. 
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Loosely speaking our estimate of 28% implies that if France were to lower its 
environmental regulation and enforcement to the level of Greece, in a year period it 
would have attracted about 28% more UK FDI in the pollution-intensive industries. 
These are 9 sectors with above average pollution intensity, including: leather & related 
products, paper & pulp products and coke & refined petroleum products. 
As already pointed out in the introduction comparison of our estimated effect of 
environmental policy with others’ estimates is not easy but let’s try to make some broad 
comparisons with Kellenberg (2009). Kellenberg finds an elasticity figure of 2.8% and a 
2.5% increase in laxity12 over years 1999 to 2003 in countries in the 20th percentile in 
FDI growth.  Hence, he finds a 2.5% increase in environmental laxity increased US 
affiliate value added by approximately 7%. 
Now for comparison with our estimates, let us consider changes in laxity in 
developing countries and the resulting change in FDI. Over our sample period (2002-
2006) laxity in developing countries increased by about 4%. This translates into 0.13 
standard deviation unit. Our estimate predicts that a one standard deviation increase in 
laxity results in 28% increase in FDI. Hence, the increase in UK FDI to these developing 
countries is about 4% which is smaller than Kellenberg’s estimate. 
 
                                                     
12 Note that we are discussing in terms of laxity for comparison with us but his discussion is in term 
stringency. 
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Table 1 Industry characteristics 
Variables Definition Source Mean 
Std. Dev. 
Overall 
between 
within 
Min Max 
Assets Total assets (millions of 2005 $) Orbis database (Bureau van Dijk). 82.95 943.86 0 46,452 
 
      824.36  
  
 
      484.92  
  Turnover Operating revenue (millions of 2005 $) Orbis database (Bureau van Dijk) 115.29 1,526.98 0 57,281 
 
   1,388.27  
  
 
      687.03  
  Environmental 
costs 
Pollution abatement operating costs as a 
share of value added 
The UK Environmental Protection 
Expenditure survey 
0.02 0.02 0.00 0.11 
 0.02   
 0.01   
Physical capital 
intensity 
Non-wage value added per worker: (value 
added - total compensation)/employees 
UK Office of National Statistics, 
Annual Business Inquiry 
0.05 0.08 0.00 0.39 
 0.08   
 0.01   
Human capital 
intensity 
Share of value added paid to skilled workers: 
((total compensation)/value added )-
((unskilled wage* employment) / value added) 
UK Office of National Statistics, 
Annual Business Inquiry 
0.57 0.16 0.16 0.97 
 0.16   
 0.04   
R&D intensity R&D expenditure as a share of value added STAN R&D expenditures in 
Industry (ISIC Rev. 3). (see the 
Appendix for issues of mapping) 
0.08 0.11 0.00 0.52 
 0.11   
 0.01   
Scale 
economies 
Number of employees per plant UK Office of National Statistics, 
Annual Business Inquiry 
0.55 0.90 0.09 5.46 
 0.88   
 0.23   
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Table 2 Country characteristics 
Variables Definition Source Mean Std. Dev. 
Overall 
Between 
within 
Min Max 
Skilled labor 
abundance  
 School enrolment: % of population with tertiary 
education   
 World Bank Development Indicators  44.67 24.77 1.66 97.51 
 24.67   
 3.53   
R&D abundance   Researchers per million people (‘000)   World Bank Development Indicators  1,837.17 1,820.13 0.10 8,007.50 
 1,824.44   
 161.30   
Capital 
abundance  
  Capital per worker multiplied by number of 
workers (in 1000s)   in trillions of PPP $ (a lá 
Debaere and Demiroglu, Journal of International 
Economics, 2003).  
 Constructed based on data from different sources 
(see the Appendix for details)  
136.40 337.10 0.84 2,324.24 
 337.60   
 33.30   
GDP   Gross Domestic Product (in billions of 2005 
PPP$)  
 World Bank Development Indicators  744.85 1,703.20 8.27 12,900.00 
 
1,709.30 8.43 12,200.00 
 
125.77 -192.89 1,873.07 
Tariff   The average (over industries) import tariff rates   UNCTAD TRAINS database  5.24 5.41 0.10 30.87 
 5.09   
 1.92   
orruption   Corruption Perception Index   Transparency International  5.17 2.43 1.70 9.70 
 2.42   
 0.30   
FDI stock   FDI stock is the value of the share of capital and 
reserves (including retained profits) attributable 
to the parent enterprise, plus the net 
indebtedness of affiliates to the parent 
enterprises in millions of 2005 PPP $  
 UNCTADstat, UNCTAD  168.37 361.86 0.53 3,190.14 
 
360.15 1.01 2,723.25 
 
49.90 -361.98 635.26 
Environmental 
regulation 
stringency  
 The stringency of overall environmental 
regulation: (1= lax compared with most other 
countries, 7=among the world’s most stringent).  
 World Economic Forum, Yale Center for 
Environmental Law and Policy, and CIESIN   
4.40 1.29 1.90 6.80 
 1.27   
 0.24   
Enforcement of 
Environmental 
regulation  
 Consistency of regulation enforcement: (1= not 
enforced or enforced erratically, 7= enforced 
consistently and fairly)  
 Ibid  4.08 1.06 1.90 6.40 
  1.03   
  0.25   
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Variables Definition Source Mean Std. Dev. 
Overall 
Between 
within 
Min Max 
Environmental 
policy index 
laxity  
 The inverse of the product of ‘Environmental 
regulation stringency and ‘Enforcement of 
Environmental regulation’: (1- this product/50)  
 Ibid  0.61 0.20 0.17 0.92 
  0.20   
  0.04   
Crime   Organized crime  such as racketeering and 
extortion: (1= imposes significant costs on 
business,  7= does not impose significant costs 
on business)  
 Ibid  4.86 1.22 1.90 6.90 
   1.19   
   0.29   
Intellectual 
property   
 Intellectual property protection: (1= weak or 
nonexistent, 7= equal to the world’s stringent)   
 Ibid  4.09 1.29 1.10 6.60 
  1.26   
  0.30   
Hiring and firing 
practices  
 Hiring and firing of workers: (1= impeded by 
regulations, 7= determined by employers)  
 Ibid  3.46 0.87 1.60 6.30 
  0.78   
  0.40   
Infrastructure   Overall infrastructure quality: (1= poorly 
developed and inefficient, 7= among the best in 
the world)  
 Ibid  4.16 1.45 1.00 6.90 
   1.41   
   0.37   
Education   Quality of education: (1= of poor quality, 7= 
equal to the world’s stringent)  
 Ibid  4.01 1.22 1.20 6.70 
   1.15 1.74 6.16 
   0.41 2.69 .55 
Agricultural value 
added per 
worker  
 The output of the agricultural sector (ISIC 
divisions 1-5) less the value of intermediate 
inputs divided by the number of workers 
(‘000,000)  
 World Development Indicators (derived from World 
Bank national accounts files and Food and 
Agriculture Organization, Production Yearbook and 
data files) and Eurostat to complement some missing 
data for EU countries. 
13.80 15.60 0.70 57.70 
 15.40   
 1.50   
Agricultural land 
per worker  
 Square kilometers per worker   World Development Indicators (plus Canadian 
statistics for Canada)  
0.40 1.31 0.01 10.33 
  1.31   
  0.04   
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Table 3 Regression of FDI outflows 
Dependent variable: Ln Assets 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES OLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS IV-2SLS 
            
Env. laxity*Pollution-intensity 0.0587 0.240** 0.283* 0.417** 0.285* 
 
(0.0617) (0.104) (0.154) (0.197) (0.154) 
Skilled labor*Skill-intensity 0.117 0.161 0.159 0.544*** 0.159 
 
(0.0860) (0.104) (0.103) (0.0812) (0.103) 
R&D*R&D-intensity  0.187* 0.189* 0.188* 0.184* 0.188* 
 
(0.0971) (0.0996) (0.0983) (0.105) (0.0983) 
Capital*Capital-intensity -0.242 -0.234 -0.233 -0.266 -0.233 
 
(0.212) (0.212) (0.209) (0.246) (0.209) 
Market potential*Scale economies 0.406** 0.414** 0.414** 0.322 0.413** 
 
(0.195) (0.195) (0.193) (0.214) (0.193) 
IP protection     0.912*** -0.257 
 
   (0.165) (0.275) 
Hiring & Firing     -1.052*** -0.0323 
 
   (0.0591) (0.137) 
Crime    -0.693*** 0.148 
 
   (0.0851) (0.264) 
Tariff     -0.200*** 0.0860 
 
   (0.0629) (0.126) 
Corruption    -0.766*** -0.0696 
 
   (0.151) (0.411) 
Infrastructure    -0.252* -0.275 
 
   (0.148) (0.308) 
Education     1.010*** -0.0209 
 
   (0.102) (0.222) 
FDI stock    1.225*** 0.150 
 
   (0.109) (1.130) 
Distance    -0.0002***  
 
   (0.0000)  
Common Language    -0.360**  
 
   (0.152)  
Constant 0.528 0.537 4.833*** 3.779*** 1.002 
 
(0.416) (0.547) (1.017) (0.522) (2.290) 
Industry fixed effects Yes 
    Year fixed effects Yes 
    Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Industry by Year fixed effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Underidentification 
  
0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Weak Identification 
  
258.267*** 189.326*** 260.548*** 
Overidentification 
  
0.0125** 0.0001*** 0.0123** 
Joint Significance of Endog. Regressors 
  
0.0021*** 0.000*** 0.0019*** 
Observations 5888 5888 5888 5888 5888 
R-squared 0.444 0.445 0.445 0.250 0.446 
Notes:  
i) Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
ii) Excluded instruments are agricultural value added per worker and agricultural land per worker. Underidentification 
reports the p-value of Anderson canonical correlations likelihood ratio test of identification and rejection indicates that the 
model is identified. Weak Identification reports the Cragg-Donald F test for the presence of weak instruments (meaning 
that the model is only weakly identified). Overidentification reports the p-value of Hansen J statistic test of instrument 
validity and rejection casts doubt on the validity. Joint Significance reports the p-value of Anderson-Rubin Chi-square test 
of joint significance of endogenous regressors in the structural equation. 
29 
 
Appendix: additional notes on data 
Sample of countries and excluded observations 
The list of countries used in our sample is presented in Table A.2. We dropped 
several countries for various reasons. The following countries were dropped because 
there were no data for our main variable which is environmental policy stringency 
and enforcement: Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. Cote d'Ivoire, Kazakhstan, Liberia, Nepal, Senegal, Sudan and 
Uzbekistan. 
 
The following countries were dropped because of missing data on different country 
characteristics, mainly R&D:  Angola, Bangladesh, Cameroon, El Salvador, Georgia, 
Ghana Honduras, Hong Kong SAR, China, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Tanzania, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Arab Emirates and Zimbabwe. 
 
The following countries were dropped because they had limited observations or/and 
not-so-time-varying country characteristics and they were consistently dropped 
automatically due to multicollinearity: Kenya and Paraguay.  
Extrapolation and construction of data on country and industry characteristics 
The World Economic Forum database has some missing data for the following 
country variables and we have completed the series by simple interpolations: 
environmental stringency, enforcement of environmental regulation, R&D 
abundance, education quality, infrastructure, IP protection, and hiring & firing 
practices. The same applies to the tariff variable from UNCTAD, the corruption 
variable from Transparency International and the agricultural value added per 
worker variable from World Development Indicators. 
 
In all of these cases the missing data were for one and rarely for two years here and 
there. Moreover most of these variables don’t normally change much over time 
hence our interpolation would be a fairly good approximation. In any case adding 
these interpolated observations in our sample haven’t made any significant change 
in our main results. The main issue with the missing data was that it aggravated our 
multicolinearity problems with the dropping of one country here and another there 
which was more a nuisance rather than a substantive problem.   
  
We followed Debaere and Demiroglu, Journal of International Economics (2003) to 
construct the capital abundance variable, defined as capital per worker multiplied by 
number of workers, as follows. We used ‘GDP per worker’ and ‘capital per worker’ 
(both in 1985 international prices for 1990-1992 from Pen World Tables) to obtain a 
regression equation to predict ‘capital per worker’ for given ‘GDP per person 
employed’ (from WDI in 1990 PPP $) for our sample years. We used the product of 
‘labor force’ and ‘employment rate’   (both from ILO) to obtain ‘number of workers’.   
 
Mapping OECD’s R&D expenditures data which is classified in ISIC Rev. 3 to Orbis’ 
industry classification of UK SIC 2007 was more or less straightforward. One case 
that wasn’t and worth mentioning here is the case of ‘Manufacture of computer; 
electronic and optical products’ (UK SIC 26). This was mapped to the weighted 
average of three ISIC Rev. 3 industry groups: Office, accounting and computing 
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machinery (c30), Radio, television and communication equipment (c32) and Medical, 
precision and optical instruments (c33). The weight used was the value of turnover 
in the respective industry groups. 
 
Agricultural land per worker was calculated as follows. We used data on agricultural 
value added per worker and agricultural value added from WDI to obtain number of 
agricultural workers. We then divided agricultural land in sq. km from WDI by 
number of workers. For Canada, data on agricultural value added was missing from 
WDI database so we obtained these data from Statistics Canada: Table 002-0004 - 
Agriculture value added account, annual. 
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Table A.1 Overview of empirical literature  
Author(s)  Type of data Addressing 
endogeneity 
FDI flows to/from Measures of environmental regulation*  Evidence 
of PHH 
List and Co (2000) Cross-section No To US from various Government expenditures (two types); List 
& D’Arge’s Index; PACE 
Yes 
Keller and Levinson (2002) Panel  Yes To US from various PACE Yes 
Xing and Kolstad (2002) Cross-section Yes To various from US  Emissions Yes 
Eskeland and Harrison (2003) Panel No To developing countries from US  PACE & emissions No 
Fredriksson et al. (2003) Panel Yes To US from various PACE Yes 
Javorcik and Wei (2004) Cross-section No To Eastern Europe from various Emissions & subjective index Mixed 
Cole and Elliot (2005) Panel Yes To Brazil and Mexico from US PACE No 
Spatareanu (2007) Cross-section No To Europe from various Executive Opinion Survey (GCR) Yes 
Waldkirch & Gopinath (2008) Cross-section No To Mexico from various Emissions Mixed 
Cole and Fredriksson (2009) Cross-section Yes From various to various  Emissions Yes 
Dean et al. (2009) Cross-section No To China from various PACE Mixed 
Kellenberg (2009) Panel Yes To various from US  Executive Opinion Survey (from GCR) Yes 
Wagner and Timmins (2009) Panel Yes To various from Germany Executive Opinion Survey (from GCR) Yes 
Hanna (2010) Panel No To various from US  US Clean Air Act: (non)attainment Yes 
Manderson & Kneller (2012) Cross-section No To various from UK  PACE & Executive Opinion Survey (GCR) No 
Kheder & Zugravu (2012) Cross-section Yes To various from France  subjective index Mixed 
Millimet & Roy (2015) Panel Yes To US from various PACE Yes 
Poelhekke & van der Ploeg (2015) Panel Yes To various from Netherlands  Executive Opinion Survey (GCR) Mixed 
*Notes. PACE: Pollution abatement and control expenditure by firms. Executive Opinion Survey: Company executive opinions from the Global Competitiveness Report. 
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Table A.2 List of sample countries 
Algeria New Zealand 
Argentina Norway 
Australia Pakistan 
Austria Philippines 
Belgium Poland 
Brazil Portugal 
Bulgaria Romania 
Canada Russian Federation 
Chile Slovenia 
China South Africa 
Colombia Spain 
Costa Rica Sri Lanka 
Croatia Sweden 
Czech Republic Switzerland 
Denmark Thailand 
Ecuador Tunisia 
Egypt, Arab Rep. Turkey 
Estonia Ukraine 
Ethiopia United States 
Finland Uruguay 
France Venezuela, RB 
Germany Zambia 
Greece 
 Guatemala 
 Hungary 
 Iceland 
 India 
 Indonesia 
 Ireland 
 Italy 
 Japan 
 Korea, Rep. 
 Latvia 
 Lithuania 
 Luxembourg 
 Macedonia, FYR 
 Madagascar 
 Malaysia 
 Malta 
 Mexico 
 Morocco 
 Netherlands 
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Table A.3 List of industries 
UK SIC 2007= 
NACE 2 
Name 
10 Food products                                                                              
11 Beverages                                                                                  
12 Tobacco products                                                                           
13 Textiles                                                                                   
14 Wearing apparel                                                                            
15 Leather and related products                                                               
16 Wood and of products of wood and cork; except furniture; manufacture of 
articles of straw 
17 Paper and paper products                                                                   
18 Production of recorded media                                                               
19 Coke and refined petroleum products                                                        
20 Chemicals and chemical products                                                            
21 Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations                              
22 Rubber and plastic products                                                                
23 Other non-metallic mineral products                                                        
24 Basic metals                                                                               
25 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment        " 
26 Computer; electronic and optical products                            
27 Electrical equipment                                                                       
28 Machinery and equipment n.e.c.                                                             
29 Motor vehicles; trailers and semi-trailers                                                 
30 Other transport equipment                                                                  
31 Furniture                                                                                  
32 Other manufacturing                                                                                       
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Table A.4. First stage regressions of outward FDI: dependent variable is Env. laxity*Pollution-intensity 
 
IV model referred to  in Table 3 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
       Skilled labor*skill-intensity 0.012 
 
0.004 
 
0.012 
 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.009) 
 R&D*R&D-intensity  0.008 
 
0.017 
 
0.008 
 
 
(0.010) 
 
(0.011) 
 
(0.010) 
 Capital*Capital-intensity 0.008 
 
-0.006 
 
0.008 
 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.009) 
 Market potential*Scale economies 0.002 
 
-0.004 
 
0.002 
 
 
(0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.007) 
 IP protection 
 
-0.265 *** -0.106 * 
   
(0.024) 
 
(0.057) 
 Hiring & Firing  
 
-0.043 *** 0.008 
 
   
(0.006) 
 
(0.012) 
 Crime 
  
0.032 *** -0.019 
 
   
(0.009) 
 
(0.022) 
 Tariff  
  
-0.017 *** -0.004 
 
   
(0.006) 
 
(0.01) 
 Corruption 
  
0.016 
 
-0.035 
 
   
(0.014) 
 
(0.109) 
 Infrastructure 
 
0.001 
 
-0.066 * 
   
(0.016) 
 
(0.037) 
 Education  
 
0.022 ** -0.026 
 
   
(0.010) 
 
(0.022) 
 FDI stock 
 
0.065 *** 0.116 
 
   
(0.004) 
 
(0.077) 
 Distance 
  
-0.000006 *** 
  
   
(0.000) 
   Common Language 
  
0.117 *** 
  
   
(0.018) 
   AgriLandperWorker*Pollution-intensity -8.413 *** -5.976 *** -8.347 *** 
 
(1.139) 
 
(1.314) 
 
(1.125) 
 AgrOutperPerson*Pollution-intensity -0.677 *** -0.590 *** -0.677 *** 
 
(0.017) 
 
(0.021) 
 
(0.017) 
 Constant 3.752 *** 0.738 *** 5.12 
 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.048) 
 
(0.431) *** 
Country fixed effects 
      Industry by Year fixed effects Yes    Yes  
Country by Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
       
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments 0.474    0.396  0.477  
F statistic        301.332***  116.994***  311.649***  
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Table A.5. Regression of FDI outflows (robustness checks): alternative LHS variable; continuous country and intensity 
variables; Industry-by-year & Reg-by-year F. effects; Industry & Reg-by-Year F. effects; Error terms clustered at 
country-level  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 VARIABLES LHS variable: 
Turnover 
RHS variables 
are all 
continuous 
Linear terms of 
interaction 
variables included 
Ind*YrDumies & 
Region*Yr 
Dummies 
IndDumies & 
Region*Yr 
Dummies 
Error terms 
clustered by 
country 
Env. laxity*Pollution-
intensity 
0.265* 0.953*** 0.279* 0.394** 3.019** 0.285** 
(0.16) (0.24) (0.16) (0.192) (1.326) (0.145) 
Skilled labour*skill-
intensity 
0.218** 0.221 0.17 0.408*** 0.198* 0.159 
(0.11) (0.16) (0.11) (0.0863) (0.110) (0.0992) 
R&D*R&D-intensity  0.177* 0.0288* 0.182* 0.164 0.195* 0.188* 
(0.10) (0.02) (0.10) (0.104) (0.114) (0.0971) 
Capital*Capital-
intensity 
-0.00729 0.0878* -0.243 -0.324 -0.234 -0.233* 
(0.21) (0.05) (0.22) (0.244) (0.264) (0.125) 
Market potential * 
Scale economies 
0.379** 0.290*** 0.471*** 0.310 0.337 0.413*** 
(0.18) (0.04) (0.18) (0.214) (0.226) (0.113) 
IP protection  0.0439 -1.276* -0.435 0.801*** 1.206*** -0.257 
(0.29) (0.66) (0.29) (0.174) (0.323) (0.301) 
Hiring & Firing  -0.149 -0.391 -0.0777 -0.904*** -0.890*** -0.0323 
(0.14) (0.53) (0.13) (0.0622) (0.0734) (0.147) 
Crime 0.115 0.143 0.19 -0.797*** -0.927*** 0.148 
(0.28) (0.89) (0.25) (0.0901) (0.126) (0.270) 
Tariff  -0.0605 -0.0218 0.155 0.0616 -0.00666 0.0860 
(0.14) (0.22) (0.13) (0.0742) (0.0865) (0.171) 
Corruption -1.005** -0.758 0.22 -1.005*** -0.491* -0.0696 
(0.42) (0.73) (0.37) (0.174) (0.258) (0.450) 
Infrastructure -0.302 -0.523 0.324 -0.110 -0.0292 -0.275 
(0.32) (0.52) (0.23) (0.143) (0.182) (0.315) 
Education  -0.0271 -0.515 0.127 1.073*** 1.153*** -0.0209 
(0.23) (0.65) (0.17) (0.100) (0.122) (0.229) 
FDI stock -1.076 0.155 -0.0208 1.666*** 1.660*** 0.150 
(1.21) (0.30) (1.35) (0.135) (0.148) (0.988) 
Pollution-intensity   -0.970*    
  (0.52)    
Skill- intensity   0.396**    
  (0.20)    
R & D- intensity   0.00258    
  (0.13)    
Capital-intensity   1.462***    
  (0.21)    
Scale economies   0.824***    
  (0.23)    
EnvPol   -0.0571    
  (0.37)    
Skill abundance   -0.463    
  (0.55)    
R & D abundance   1.071    
  (0.89)    
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Capital abundance   -3.693    
  (4.30)    
Market potential   6.834    
  (4.82)    
Constant 3.893 11.11*** -22.29 3.263*** -2.625 1.522 
 (2.41) (3.26) (15.37) (1.145) (3.150) (2.455) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes   Yes 
Industry by Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region by Year fixed 
effects 
   Yes Yes  
Industry effects     Yes  
Underidentification 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Weak Identification 260.548*** 74.050*** 265.099.*** 188.413*** 13.53*** 15.552*** 
Overidentification 0.0168** 0.9233 0.0172** 0.000*** 0.00211*** 0.0123** 
Joint Significance of 
Endog. Regressors 
0.0046*** 0.0004*** 0.0036*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Observations 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 5,888 
R-squared 0.416 0.454 0.407 0.280 0.025 0.446 
Notes:       
i) Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
ii) Excluded instruments are agricultural value added per worker and agricultural land per worker. Underidentification 
reports the p-value of Anderson canonical correlations likelihood ratio test of identification and rejection indicates that 
the model is identified. Weak Identification reports the Cragg-Donald F test (except in Column 6 where the test is the 
Keibergen –Paap F test) for the presence of weak instruments (meaning that the model is only weakly identified). 
Overidentification reports the p-value of Hansen J statistic test of instrument validity and rejection casts doubt on the 
validity. Joint Significance reports the p-value of Anderson-Rubin Chi-square test of joint significance of endogenous 
regressors in the structural equation. 
 
 
